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Services are expensive in rich countries. Yet rich countries often have poor neigh-
bours where the same services are cheaper. Service price disparity and the geograph-
ical proximity of rich and poor countries then coincide to the mutual beneﬁt of the
neigbouring borderlands. Rich shoppers can buy services more cheaply on the poor
side of the border than they could at home, while the sellers of these services can
charge these buyers more than they could local buyers. Indeed, cross-border shop-
ping in services is a visible part of daily life along many international borders. US
borderlanders consume services in neighbouring Mexico, as do Polish borderlanders
in neighbouring Ukraine, Italian borderlanders in adjacent Slovenia, and those of
Russia’s far eastern Vladivostok in nearby Chinese cities.
We emphasise that service prices can diﬀer hugely. A hair cut in a poor coun-
try, say, may cost as little as one ﬁfth of what its rich neighbour equivalent costs,
with no diﬀerence in quality. Moreover, cross-border sales can make a substantial
contribution to the volume of bilateral trade. For these reasons we suggest that
cross-border shopping can not only improve shopping opportunities for the rich, it
can also increase job opportunities for the poor.
However, potential gains from cross-border shopping often are a long way from
being fully exploited. Popular explanations point to the transaction costs of crossing
borders. Of course, annoying border controls and insuﬃcient infrastructure surely
play an important role. Ultimately, however, the transaction costs induced cannot
explain the low level of cross-border shopping observed; transaction costs must be
seen as being politically determined rather than being exogenously given. Within
a framework deﬁned by (inter)national politics, local governments could still carry
out regional integration projects that would slash transaction costs. They could, for
example, improve the local cross-border infrastructure and public transport. And
many of these projects would be welfare enhancing, with the aggregate beneﬁts of
these projects that result from lower transaction costs exceeding their respective
costs. So the interesting question is why local authorities might fail to reduce trans-
action costs, and hence might fail to realise the full gains from cross-border shopping.
For instance, just recently, a proposal to link Frankfurt and Slubice, a twin city pair
on the Polish-German border, by public tram was rejected by Frankfurt voters and
was shelved.
In this paper, we provide a political economy explanation for cross-border shopping
being ineﬃciently low. Speciﬁcally, we show (i) how this outcome can result from
local political inaction backed by a majority of the electorate, (ii) how local policy
is shaped by the interaction between borderland populations and their respective
hinterland populations, and (iii) how local decisions embedded in a federal struc-
ture are related to (inter-)national regulations. Our explanation builds on two key
characteristics where individuals diﬀer: cultural ability and interregional mobility.
The term cultural ability refers to an individual’s ability to interact with individ-
1uals whose cultural background is profoundly diﬀerent from her own. It captures
the psychological cost of serving, or being served by, those from the border’s other
side. The term interregional mobility refers to the ease with which an individual
moves from a country’s borderland to its respective hinterland, and vice versa. It
stands for her ‘emotional’ attachment-to-home. Individuals diﬀer in both cultural
ability and interregional mobility. Jointly these two heterogeneities are at the heart
of the distributional conﬂicts that eventually give rise to ineﬃcient policies.
Heterogenous cultural ability generates both winners and losers of local integra-
tion projects among borderland natives. And heterogenous mobility prevents per-
fect community sorting according to political preferences. But even the imperfect
sorting that can occur feeds back into the distributional implications of integration
projects and thus into their political appeal. Mobility – which can be interpreted
as a measure for intracountry integration – shapes cross-border integration policy
in the borderlands.
We analyse the resulting interplay in a two-country-four-region model. In each
country’s border region there is a referendum on a regional integration project that
would lower the transaction costs of cross-border shopping. The eﬀectiveness of this
project depends on exogenous national regulations. If the electorate approves the
proposal, citizens can still escape the local taxes necessary to ﬁnance the project
by moving to the respective hinterland. Hinterland natives, on the other hand, can
move to their respective borderland to take advantage of its speciﬁc job or shopping
opportunities. But these newcomers then also have to bear their share of the tax.
Starting from a situation in which transaction costs are high initially, we provide
three major results: ﬁrst, voting is biased against regional integration projects.
Speciﬁcally, not only will a welfare reducing project (meaning that aggregate welfare
gains from lower transaction costs fall short of project costs) never be approved, but
a welfare enhancing project may also fail politically. More technically, while the
feature ‘welfare enhancing’ is a necessary condition for a local integration project to
succeed at the polls, it is not suﬃcient.
Second, a rise in intra-country mobility erodes the political support for integra-
tion projects, particularly (but not only) if borderland homes are owned by absentee
landlords. This result is especially disturbing, given that at the same time higher mo-
bility permits more eﬃcient community sorting and thus raises the potential welfare
gains from cross-border shopping. We argue that higher mobility tends to dimin-
ish realised welfare gains by impeding the integration project politically, thereby
keeping transaction costs up.
Third, local support for the integration project is strengthened if central gov-
ernments themselves take steps to cut transaction costs. In this sense, there is a
complementarity between (inter-)national and regional policies. By contrast, federal
grants do not necessarily raise the share of votes in favour of the regional project.
The paper looks at the potential of cross-border shopping and the political dif-
ﬁculties encountered by any attempts to make use of this potential. It highlights
2how two types of interactions that have not previously been associated with cross-
border shopping – those between borderlands and hinterlands and those between
local initiatives and national regulations – aﬀect political failure. In particular, it
points to the ways in which growing household mobility may drive a wedge between
potential and realised welfare, and thereby provides a laboratory view of the ambi-
guities of ‘globalisation’. All in all, the paper connects cross-border shopping to the
political economy of local public infrastructure investment, to household sorting, to
ﬁscal federalism, and, in a more ﬁgurative sense, to globalisation. We brieﬂy address
existing work on cross-border shopping, community sorting and voting, and also on
the other themes related to our contribution:
Cross-border shopping is prominent in the literature on tax competition (see, e.g.,
Kanbur/Keen (1993) and, more recently, Hauﬂer (2001), Lucas (2004) and Nielsen
(2001, 2002)). In these papers, competing governments strategically set commodity
taxes to attract cross-border shoppers and raise domestic tax revenues. Since cross-
border shopping results from distortionary tax diﬀerentials between countries, it is
welfare-reducing. By contrast, in our framework, cross-border shopping results from
international productivity gaps and the induced producer price diﬀerentials. Taking
advantage of these is generally welfare-enhancing.
However, the extent to which the comparative advantage can be utilised depends
on the political decisions about the local integration project and on the types of
individuals living in the border regions. In analysing these issues, our paper con-
tributes to the literature on household mobility, public expenditures, and voting
(see, e.g., Epple et al. (1984, 1993), Hansen/Kessler (2001), Kessler/Lülfesmann
(2005) and Westhoﬀ (1977)). These papers explore how diﬀerent household types
sort into communities when local voters decide on local expenditures on public goods
or redistribution. In contrast to these contributions, we explicitly focus on the am-
biguous role of mobility: its positive impact on potential welfare and its negative
political impact on realised welfare. Considering cross-border projects, we analyse
the link between international and regional integration, which is not considered in
the literature above, and stress the role of diﬀerent land ownership regimes. The
criterion which induces sorting in the current context, namely the ability to interact
with people of diﬀerent cultures, should be new to a literature typically focusing on
variation within a given country.1
Finally notice that some features of cross-border shopping and sorting also appear
in other contexts, for instance, in connection with the ‘maquiladoras’ strung along
the US-Mexican border. But, in that case, industries, not consumers, ‘cross-border
shop’, taking advantage of the proximity to the other country and buying intermedi-
ate goods on the poor side of the border (see, e.g., Grunwald (1985), Hanson (1996,
2001)).
1E.g., common sorting criteria in the literature include income and preferences for local pub-
lic goods (e.g., Kessler/Lülfesmann (2005)), race (e.g., Alesina et al. (2004)), peer eﬀects (e.g.,
Calabrese et al. (2005)), and pro-social behavior (Lazear et al. (2006)).
3The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model’s central
components. Section 3 discusses the ‘Shopping and Migration (ShoMig) Equilib-
rium’ that obtains for a given level of cross-border integration. Section 4 looks into
ShoMig Equilibrium’s comparative static properties with respect to political and
other variables. Section 5 adds the political economy dimension by analysing how
borderland voters (in full knowledge of the mechanisms discussed earlier) decide on
a local integration project proposed to them. Section 6 analyses how majority out-
comes vary with the central government constraints imposed on, and the subsidies
given to, them. Section 7 discusses the model’s results and sketches some politi-
cal implications. Concluding remarks and suggestions for further research follow in
section 8.
2 Building Blocks
We start by presenting the building blocks of our four-region-two-country model of
cross-border shopping and community sorting when local citizens vote on a cross-
border integration project. Let us state the basic geographic, technological, individ-
ual and political features in turn.
Geography and Housing: The model’s geography is straightforward enough. Neigh-
bouring countries Poor P and Rich R consist of a border and interior region each.
Poor Border PB and Rich Border RB are adjacent to one another. Their shared
boundary is the border of the countries. Poor Interior PI and Rich Interior RI
are the respective hinterlands of the border regions. Countries are indexed j =
P,R, proximity to the border is indexed k = B,I, and regions are indexed jk =
PB, RB, PI, RI. Individuals are born in either of these regions. The resulting
number of people native to region jk is Nj, i.e., country j’s two regions jB and jI
have identical native populations, for simplicity. Each individual always occupies
one dwelling of unit size. So initially, the housing stock in region jk is Nj, too.
While housing stocks in border regions jB remain ﬁxed, stocks in interior regions
jI may subsequently be expanded, at a constant per unit cost dj. (This assump-
tion simpliﬁes our analysis considerably. But, as discussed in section 6, our major
qualitative results remain valid in a more general setting).
Technologies and Trade: An industrial good x and a services good y are produced
with Ricardian technologies. Labour is perfectly mobile across sectors, and each
labour unit employed in sector x (y) produces aj (bj) units of good x (y) in j.
Workers in Rich are better at producing x than are workers in Poor, i.e., aR > aP,
but are only equally good at providing y, i.e., bR = bP = b. These assumptions reﬂect
the stylised fact that gaps in international productivity are much more pronounced
in industry than in services. For convenience, productivities are normalised such
that b > 1 holds. We further assume that the industrial good x is tradable and
4can be shipped at no cost while the services good y is not tradable. However, the
individuals residing in Rich Border can cross-border shop and buy the services good
abroad in nearby Poor Border while those living and working in Poor Border can
provide the services good for Rich shoppers. Going one step further, we assume
that Poor Border’s service suppliers can choose between serving Poor shoppers only
and exclusively supplying Rich shoppers. Poor Border residents doing the latter are
dubbed ‘cross-border sellers”.
Interregional Mobility: Individuals from one country may shop, yet neither live nor
work in the other country. Within either country, each citizen is free to choose the
region in which she lives and works. Intra-country mobility, however, is imperfect
and varies substantially across individuals. Some individuals are strongly attached
to their native region, or ﬁnd it diﬃcult to integrate into a new environment. Others,
by contrast, have only weak links to their home region or get in touch with people
in new places easily. Let mh
jk denote such home attachment’s pecuniary equivalent
for native h of region jk (see, e.g., Mansoorian/Myers (1993)). We refer to this
equivalent as migration costs, being the costs of moving from one’s home region to
the other region.
Cultural Ability: Individuals also diﬀer in their cultural ability, i.e., their ability
to interact with people from the other side of the border. This ability determines
the cultural transaction costs (in short: cultural costs) of those involved in cross-
border selling and shopping. Both sellers and shoppers need to become familiar
with diﬀerent sets of social norms. Moreover, sellers have to adapt their strategies
to the needs of customers with a diﬀerent cultural background and mother tongue
while shoppers need to be aware of new business and legal rules. Finally, shoppers
and sellers alike must tolerate close contact with someone earning a very diﬀerent
income (see the role of status in, e.g., Frank, 1987). Let zh
jk denote the resulting
cultural costs for native h from region jk who cross-border shops or sells. Certainly
the cultural cost of providing services to, or of being served by, foreigners varies
across individuals. Generally costs are lower for those skilled in languages and able
to blend in.
Heterogeneity: To capture the heterogeneity in interregional mobility and cultural
ability simultaneously, we assume that characteristics of the natives to jk are dis-
tributed according to a joint c.d.f. Fj(mjk,zjk) : [0,mj]×[0,zj] 7→ [0,1], mj,zj > 0.2
More speciﬁcally, zjk and mjk are uniformly and independently distributed, imply-
ing joint density fj (mjk,zjk) = (mj zj)
−1. We emphasise that Fj is indexed by
country only, instead of by country and region. The joint distribution of transaction
and mobility costs is the same in both jB and jI. Border and Interior natives are
equally mobile and equally talented in inter-cultural interaction. Diﬀerences might,
however, exist between the individuals in the two countries, particularly between the
2Cultural costs may be negative if individuals enjoy interacting with foreigners. Similarly,
individual migration costs may be negative if the alternative region is preferred. For convenience,
though, we restrict mjk and zjk to be positive.
5cultural costs of the sellers and the shoppers. Finally, note that information on Fj is
assumed to be common knowledge, while information on individual characteristics
is not.
Property Rights: Housing property rights prove to be important for our con-
clusions. To show how the ownership structure shapes our results, we distinguish
between two regimes of ownership. With native ownership, each individual owns the
unit of housing she initially lives in. Then all Interior natives and Border natives are
simply owner-occupiers initially. In contrast, with absentee ownership, only Interior
natives own the housing they initially live in. Border natives no longer do. Instead
each Interior native now owns one unit of the ﬁxed housing stock in Border, and
each Border native pays rent rjB to her respective Interior landlord. Both housing
property rights regimes are captured by dummy αj, with
αj =

1 for native ownership, and
0 under absentee ownership. (1)
As we will discuss in section 6, these two regimes are suﬃcient to cover the interesting
cases. In particular, the regime in which Border natives own all land proves to be
redundant.
Integration Project and Transaction Costs: Residents of Rich Border may buy
services goods in nearby Poor Border, but shopping abroad incurs transaction costs
for shoppers crossing the border in addition to the individual cultural costs of in-
teracting with Poor’s sellers. These transaction costs θ ∈ [0, pR − pP] represent
the pecuniary equivalent of longer traveling time, particularly of time lost at bor-
der controls, and include additional transportation costs. They are identical for
all shoppers. Decisions at the national and international level substantially frame
these transaction costs θ, by deﬁning key parameters of the border crossing regime.
Yet, within this framework, Border governments may still have suﬃcient leeway
for political action. In particular, we assume that border regions can carry out an
‘integration project’ that would reduce transaction costs from θ down to θ, with
initial costs θ and leeway (θ−θ) exogenously determined at the national levels. The
integration project is approved if, and only if, it carries both Border regions by a
majority of votes in each. Project costs are shared among Border Regions, with ej
to be raised in jB and cost shares ej exogenously given. Funding for project costs
is raised lump sum among Borders’ residents, with tax tjB simply given by
tjB = ej/Nj. (2)
Utility and Timing: Each individual supplies one unit of labour to its region of
residence, and consumes one unit of services and housing each. Given our pecuniary
equivalents θ, zi
jk, and mi
jk and deﬁning the industrial good x as numeraire good,






















6where γz = 1 (γm = 1) if native h from region jk cross-border shops or cross-border
sells (migrates) and γz = 0 (γm = 0) otherwise.
Individuals need to make decisions at two stages. At stage 1, the countries’ Border
natives vote on the integration project simultaneously. At stage 2, every individual
decides on whether to migrate or not, and, if she chooses to reside in Poor (Rich)
Border, on whether to become cross-border seller (cross-border shopper) or not.
Taxes that eventually result from the integration project are levied on the ultimate
residents of the Borders. So Borders’ natives can escape from taxation through
migration.3 Individuals maximise their utility and are fully aware of how the voting
outcome aﬀects the succeeding location and occupation choices. All transactions
are carried out in perfectly competitive markets. As usual, we solve the model
by backward induction. The game’s second stage is discussed in sections 3 and 4.
Treatment of the game’s ﬁrst stage follows then in section 5.
3 Cross-BorderShoppingandCommunitySorting
In this section we analyse individual choices, community sorting, and cross-border
shopping for given policy parameters (θ, tPB, tRB). To this end, let us ﬁrst consider
the goods, labour, and property markets. With perfect competition, ﬁrms’ proﬁts
are zero. Normalising the price of good x to one, workers employed in j’s industrial
sector receive wage wj equal to aj. So do j’s services’ employees whoe provide y
for domestic customers, given intersectoral mobility. Then j’s services for domestic
customers carry price pj = aj/b. Speciﬁcally, pR/pP = aR/aP > 1. This prediction,
i.e. of a higher services price in the richer country, is typically referred to as the
Balassa-Samuelson-Theorem (see Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)).
The services price for cross-border shoppers has to exceed the services price for
Poor’s domestic customers pP, since cross-border sellers have to be compensated for
their cultural costs. Let one unit of cross-border services yield pC (to be determined
below). Then perfect competition ensures that the respective employees’ pay is tied
to wC = bpC. Finally, note that perfect competition in the property markets drives
Interior’s rent down to rjI = dj (whereas rjB has to be determined below). To sum
up for later reference,
wj = aj, pj =
aj
b
, wC = bpC, rjI = dj. (4)
Throughout the text we assume that θ ∈ [0, pR − pP]. Finally, we introduce, as an
3This timing is motivated by the observation that typically there is a substantial lapse of time
between the political decision to go ahead with the integration project and the subsequent rise in
taxes. So the location choice takes place after the political decision is made. We do not consider
migration before Border citizens vote on the project. This decision structure captures the fact that
individuals are simply born into one of the regions and that a region’s native population has a
‘head start’ regarding local policy choices. For an alternative timing in which location choices are
made before the regions go to the polls, see, for instance, Kessler/Luelfesmann (2005).
7auxiliary concept, ‘adjusted income’ ωj,
ωj =

wC − pP if j = P
wR − (pC + θ) if j = R . (5)
for those involved in jB’s cross-border selling and shopping, for short, cross-border
interaction.
3.1 Optimal Location, Employment, and Shopping
Let us now turn to households’ choices. Individuals decide whether to live in a
country’s Border or Interior and whether to become a cross-border seller (cross-
border shopper) or not. These choices are very similar across Pk and Rk. We can
and, for the purpose of clarity, do focus on either one of the two. Given our belief
that cross-border shopping aﬀects the poor country more strongly, we ﬁrst focus on
the choices of Poor’s natives, and all economic explanations refer to circumstances
in Poor. Thus, the index j used in our formulas represents P for the best part of
this section. Then, at the end of this subsection, we reinterpret our results from the
perspective of Rich’s natives, i.e., for j = R.
Consider a Poor Border native’s employment options ﬁrst. Firms may either be
the ‘cross-border type’ (i.e., suppliers of services to cross-border shoppers), or the
‘domestic type’ (i.e., suppliers of services to domestic customers or domestic indus-
try). Employment in cross-border type ﬁrms yields wage wC but entails cultural
costs zPB, whereas employment in domestic type ﬁrms pays wP without further
costs. Next, consider potential locations that are Poor Border and Poor Interior.
Continuing on in Poor Border requires (1−αP)rPB in rent as well as tPB in taxes. In
contrast, emigrating to Poor Interior generates landlord receipts αPrPB from renting
out the Poor Border plot that has been left behind, and entails migration costs mPB
to get to, and paying rPI to live in, Poor Interior.
Since only Poor Border employers can oﬀer cross-border services, there are three
possible combinations of employment and residential status: action (PB,PB)
refers to remaining in Poor Border while refraining from cross-border selling, action
(PB,RB) refers to remaining in Poor Border and signing up with a cross-border
type service supplier, while action (PB,PI) refers to emigrating to Poor Interior.
With prices, wages, taxes and ‘adjusted income’ deﬁned in (2), (4) and (5), the





wj − pj − (1 − αj)rjB − tjB if (jB,jB)
ωj − (1 − αj)rjB − tjB − zjB if (jB,iB)
wj − pj − rjI + αjrjB − mjB if (jB,jI)
, (6)
where, for notational convenience, individual index h is (and will remain) suppressed.
Consider ﬁrst a Poor Border native who chooses between (PB,PB) and (PB,RB).
Cross-border selling oﬀers a wage gain ωP −(wP −pP) = wC−wP. For the individual
8who is indiﬀerent between these two alternatives, this wage gain is just oﬀset by an
equally large cultural handicap zPB. Denote this threshold cultural cost by e zPB.
Poor Border natives with cultural costs below (greater than) e zPB may (will not)
become cross-border sellers. For later reference,
e zjB = ωj − (wj − pj) =

wC − wP if j = P
pR − (pC + θ) if j = R . (7)
Consider next a Poor Border native who chooses between (PB,PB) and (PB,PI).
Emigrating to Poor Interior permits rent and tax savings ∆rP +tPB, where ∆rP =
rPB − rPI deﬁnes the interregional rent diﬀerential. For the indiﬀerent individual,
these savings are just oﬀset by migration costs mPB. Denote threshold migration
cost by e mPB. Poor Border natives with migration costs mPB below (above) e mPB
may (will clearly not) move to Poor Interior. Again, for later reference,
e mjB = ∆rj + tjB. (8)
Finally, consider a Poor Border native who chooses between (PB,RB) and (PB,PI).
This individual shakes oﬀ cultural costs zPB, cashes in on rent savings ∆rP, and
even escapes Border taxation tPB, all by moving to Poor Interior. However, she still
has migration costs mPB, and faces a wage reduction wC − wP. Comparing gains
and losses, threshold cultural costs become b zPB, where b zPB ≡ ωP − (wP − pP) −
(∆rP +tPB)+mPB. Any Poor Border native with cultural costs zPB below (greater
than) b zPB prefers cross-border selling to leaving for Poor Interior (leaving for Poor
Interior to cross-border selling). For later purposes, and employing the deﬁnitions
of e zPB and e mPB introduced in (7) and (8), b zPB can be rewritten as
b zjB = e zjB − e mjB + mjB (9)
Threshold costs e zjB, e mjB and b zjB are represented by the dashed indiﬀerence loci
shown in Figure 1. These loci partition the support of the joint distribution function
FP into three sets, such that individuals with characteristics in any given one of these
sets pick the same optimal action. First, natives with both high mPB and high zPB
(associated with set (PB,PB)) stay in Border yet stay out of Rich shoppers’ way.
Second, natives with low zPB both in absolute terms and relative to mPB (associated
with (PB,RB)) stay in Poor Border to attend to Rich shoppers. And third, natives
with high to intermediate zPB but low mPB (associated with (PB,PI)) are mobile
enough to ﬁnd it worthwhile to leave altogether.
Threshold cultural cost e zPB does not vary with mPB, much as threshold migration
cost e mPB does not vary with zPB. In contrast, threshold cost b zPB does depend on
individual characteristics. The larger mPB, the larger b zPB needs to be. Intuitively,
for a native initially indiﬀerent between (PB,RB) and (PB,PI) a sudden drop in
mobility costs increases her beneﬁt from emigration. For her to remain indiﬀerent,
cultural costs also need to drop. Ultimately, this makes for the peculiarity that Poor
9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .





e zjB − e mjB
e mjB
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .






























































































. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




Figure 1: Border Natives By Employment and Eventual Location
Border natives whose cultural costs are rather low do not necessarily cross-border
sell. Those in triangle {(mPB,zPB) : mPB ≤ e mPB, e zPB− e mPB+mPB ≤ zPB ≤ e zPB}
ﬁnd leaving even better.
Poor Interior natives avail themselves of three actions that closely parallel those
open to Poor Border natives. A Poor Interior native may stay at home and thus
abstain from cross-border interaction (i.e. (PI,PI)). Or, she may move to Poor
Border to be able to cross-border sell (i.e. (PI,RB)). Or, she may move to Poor
Border yet stay away from Rich shoppers (i.e. (PI,PB)). But note that this latter
action is dominated by (PI,PI). Intuitively, a Poor Interior native who moves to
Poor Border without intending to cross-border sell does not beneﬁt from, yet still has
to pay the premium that others attach to, cross-border selling. Then the remaining
two actions’ utilities are
UjI =

wj − pj + (1 − αj)rjB if (jI,jI)
ωj + rjI − αjrjB − tjB − mjI − zjI if (jI,iB) (10)
On the one hand, a Poor Interior native beneﬁts from the wage premium wC −wP
when moving to Poor Border. On the other hand, she must incur cultural costs
zPI, migration costs mPI, ∆rP on the extra in rent, and tPB on tax. For her to be
indiﬀerent between (PI,PI) and (PI,PB), her cultural cost must equal e zPI, where
e zPI = ωP − (wP − pP) − (∆rP + tPB) − mPI. Generally, a Poor Interior native
resettles in Poor Border if, and only if, her cultural cost zPI falls short of threshold
e zPI. Poor Interior natives who head for the Border have the characteristics shown
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Figure 2: Interior Natives By Employment and Eventual Location
in Figure 2’s shaded area. Making use of e zPB and e mPB (see (7) and (8)) one more
time, threshold e zPI becomes
e zjI = e zjB − e mjB − mjI (11)
To analyse the choices of Rich’s natives, we just have to slightly modify the preced-
ing argument. The counterparts of Poor’s cross-border sellers are obviously Rich’s
cross-border shoppers. Only, the latter do not beneﬁt from higher incomes, i.e., from
wage wC instead of wP, but instead from the lower costs of services net of transac-
tion costs, i.e., from pC − θ instead of price pR. Otherwise, the beneﬁts and costs
from intra-country migration and cross-border services are qualitatively the same,
and so, too, are the corresponding utilities of Rich natives (see (5), (6), and (10)
with j = R). The resulting thresholds (7), (8) and (9) with j = R separate Rich
Border natives who continue to live in Border and buy services at home (RB,RB)
from those who remain in Border but cross-border shop (RB,PB) and those who
leave Border for Interior (RB,RI). Similarly, threshold (11) shows which types of
Rich Interior natives stay in Interior (RI,RI) and which types leave for Border and
cross-border shop (RI,PB). Thus Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate the optimal choices
of Rich natives, although the eﬀects of border proximity are presumably smaller on
their side of the border. For instance, the attraction of wage gains from cross-border
selling for Poor Interior natives should be stronger than the attraction of the services
price diﬀerential for Rich Interior natives.
113.2 Shopping and Migration Equilibrium
A ‘Cross-Border Shopping and Migration Equilibrium”, or ShoMig Equilibrium, is
the equilibrium obtained for the game’s second stage. Speciﬁcally, ShoMig Equilib-
rium requires housing, goods and services markets to balance, with ﬁrst stage policy
variables (θ,tPB,tRB) given. Since in equilibrium regional housing supply equals re-
gional housing demand, and since housing supply is ﬁxed in the border regions, any
region’s immigrant inﬂow must also equal its emigrant outﬂow. Let MjB denote the
number of those moving from jB to jI, and let MjI denote the number of those mov-
ing from jI to jB. By inspection of Figures 1 and 2, MjB = e mjB[zj −e zjB +0.5e mjB]
and MjI = 0.5[e zjB − e mjB]2. Then Migration Equilibrium requires MjB = MjI,
yielding
e mjB = [e zjB]
2/(2zj) ⇔ rjB = dj − tjB + [e zjB]
2/(2zj), (12)
where the second equation follows from substituting (8) into the ﬁrst equation. In
equilibrium, migration ties Border’s additional rent and tax burden (equal to e mjB)
to cross-border sellers’ wage premium (equal to e zPB) or cross-border shoppers’ gains
(equal to e zRB).
Next, let YP denote Poor Border’s aggregate supply of, and YR Rich Border’s ag-
gregate demand for, cross-border services. Cross-border sellers include new arrivals
in Poor Border, MPI, as well as indigenous Poor Border sellers, denoted CPB. Like-
wise, cross-border shoppers include new arrivals from Rich Interior, MRI, as well
as indigenous Rich Border shoppers, denoted CRB. Then Shopping Equilibrium
requires YP = YR, or
b(CPB + MPI) = CRB + MRI, (13)
with Y denoting equilibrium services consumption, or ‘cross-border sales”. (We
reserve the convenient term ‘sales’ for Y , rather than for the frequently implied
pCY .)
Formally, a ShoMig Equilibrium is a list of prices (pC,rPB,rRB) and corresponding
quantities (Y,CjB,MjB,MjI) that satisfy the three equilibrium conditions set out
in (12) and (13) – for a given policy set (θ,tPB,tRB), given mobility and cultural
cost parameters (mP,mR,zP,zR), and a given regime of housing property rights
(αP,αR). ShoMig Equilibrium’s basic properties are detailed in
Proposition 1: ShoMig Equilibrium
(i) ShoMig Equilibrium exists.
(ii) ShoMigEquilibrium is unique.
(iii) ShoMig Equilibrium’s prices and quantities are functions of transaction costs θ
and of migration cost parameters mP and mR.
(iv) ShoMig Equilibrium’s prices and quantities are unaﬀected by any switch in the
housing ownership regime parameter αj.
12Proofs of parts (i), (ii) and (iii) are in the Appendix, while part (iv) is explained
below. Parts (i) and (ii) just serve as a technical prerequisite for our further analysis.
Part (iii) states that, in particular, local politics’ choice of transaction costs in the
ﬁrst stage aﬀects equilibrium prices and quantities. By contrast, part (iv) points out,
more surprisingly, that the housing ownership regime is irrelevant to ShoMig Equi-
librium. The intuition for this irrelevance is straightforward. For individual choices,
opportunity costs matter, but these opportunity costs depend on rent diﬀerentials
and not on who pays and who receives rents. For instance, consider our comparison
of alternatives (PB,PB) and (PB,PI) above. With native ownership, emigration
yields rPB that is received from Poor Border but requires rPI to be paid in Poor
Interior. With absentee ownership, emigration releases rPB but also requires rPI.
For both regimes, the resulting rent diﬀerential, and hence migration cost threshold
e mPB, is the same. More generally, thresholds e zjB, e mjB, b zjB and e zjI do not depend
on the ownership regime and then neither does the ShoMig Equilibrium.
4 ShoMig Equilibrium and Integration
This section explores ShoMig Equilibrium further. Its properties identiﬁed in this
section subsequently enter the following section’s investigation into whether a given
integration project appeals to rational voters. Proposition 2 analyses how the re-
duction in transaction costs θ induced by an integration project aﬀects the ShoMig
Equilibrium. Proposition 3 discusses the extent to which the integration project’s
impact varies with changes in intra-country mobility, as captured by parameters mP
and mR. And Proposition 4 addresses the eﬀects of a given integration project on
welfare.
Proposition 2: ShoMig Equilibrium and the Integration Project
(i) Services price pC, sales Y , wage wC, and Border rents rPB and rRBare decreas-
ing, while transaction cost inclusive services price pC + θ is increasing, in θ.
(ii) The number of sellers and shoppers native to Border, CPB and CRB, as well as
the number of sellers and shoppers native to Interior, MPI and MRI, are decreasing
in transaction costs θ.
(iii) Let θ be given. Then services price pC, sales Y , and wage wC are constant
in taxes tPB and tRB. In contrast, Border rents rPB and rRB are decreasing in
respective taxes tPB and tRB.
While we delegate the formal proof to the Appendix, the underlying economics
seem intuitive enough. Suppose transaction costs θ fall. Then more Rich Border
natives will want to cross-border shop. While additional demand pushes up cross-
border services price pC, this subsequent increase is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the initial
reduction in transaction costs. That is, transaction cost inclusive of services price
13(pC + θ) also falls .4 Moreover, the increase in services’ price pC raises cross-border
sellers’ wage wC, too. In response, not only will more Poor Border natives want to
cross-border sell, but larger numbers of Poor Interior natives will be eager to join
them. Similarly (though presumably on a smaller scale), additional Rich Interior
natives move into Rich Border in order to exploit those new opportunities to shop.
As the migration ﬂows’ responses show, allowing for within-country migration
ultimately reinforces the boom in cross-border interaction triggered by the initial
drop in transaction costs. This boom is only slowed down by a rise in Border
rents subsequent to the increase in migration ﬂows. Experimenting with Figures 1
and 2 illustrates the impact of lower transaction costs θ on borderland’s population
composition. As θ falls, the e zjB-locus, the b zjB-locus and the e zjI-locus all shift
upward, while the e mjB-locus shifts to the right. In combination, these shifts produce
the changes predicted for household allocation.
The equilibrium service price is unaﬀected by tax levels tPB and tRB, and hence by
a change in the magnitude of project costs, and so, too, are equilibrium quantities.
Any change in tax level tjB immediately, and wholly, capitalises into Border rent
rjB. However, note that project costs and taxes do aﬀect the integration project’s
distribution of gains and losses. Project costs and attendant taxes turn out to be
important for individuals’ decisions at the polls (see section 5).
Now, ShoMig Equilibrium depends not just on inter-country integration, as cap-
tured by transaction costs θ, it also depends on intra-country integration, as reﬂected
by mobility parameter mj.
Proposition 3: ShoMig Equilibrium and Interregional Mobility
(i) Services price pC, wage wC and rent rPB are increasing (decreasing) in the mo-
bility parameter mP (mR), while rent rRB is decreasing (increasing) in mP (mR).
Sales Y are decreasing in either of the mobility parameters mP and mR.
(ii) The number of sellers native to Poor Border CPB (shoppers native to Rich
Border CRB) is increasing, while the number of sellers native to Poor Interior MPI
(shoppers native to Rich Interior MRI) is decreasing in mobility parameter mP
(mR).
(iii) The numbers of shoppers native to Rich Border CRB or Rich Interior MRI
(sellers native to Poor Border CPB or Poor Interior MPI) are decreasing in mobility
parameter mP (mR).
We again provide the proof in the Appendix and instead focus here on the under-
lying intuition. Suppose mobility parameter mP falls, representing an increase in
Poor households’ mobility between Poor Interior and Poor Border. (Discussion of
a fall in mR is similar and therefore dropped.) More Poor Interior natives will dis-
4A decline in transaction costs θ is similar to a fall in tariﬀs. The latter, too, drives producer
prices up, but this rise cannot overcompensate the initial cut in tariﬀs, so that consumer prices
(i.e., producer prices plus tariﬀs) also decrease.
14cover that their individual migration cost is suﬃciently low enough to make entering
Poor Border’s cross-border services sector worthwhile. Cross-border services’ supply
expands, cross-border sales Y rise subsequently, and cross-border services price pC
and wage wC correspondingly fall. While lower wage wC translates into lower Poor
Border rent rPB, lower price pC – that makes living in Rich Border more attractive
– translates into higher Rich Border rent rRB (Proposition 3, Part (i)).
Straightforward changes in prices and sales conceal important composition eﬀects.
The fall in the price of services, brought about by the extra inﬂux of Poor Interior
natives, tends to crowd Poor Border natives out of cross-border selling (Proposition
3, Part (ii)). Given that overall sales increase, the number of Poor Border natives
crowded out must surely be smaller than that of Poor Interior natives crowding
in. This composition eﬀect has no parallel in Rich. The reduction in the price of
cross-border services unambiguously attracts extra cross-border shoppers from Rich
Border and Rich Interior (Proposition 3, Part (iii)).
Finally, we turn to the regional integration project’s normative implications. We
show how its evaluation depends on the project parameters θ, tPB and tRB, on the
initial transaction cost θ, and on intra-country mobility parameters mP and mR.
This analysis later enables us to point out the circumstances under which the very
same forces that improve the project’s potential aggregate gains also undermine its
political acceptance.
Following a simple utilitarian approach, we focus on the aggregate willingness-
to-pay for the project across all individuals in order to assess the project’s welfare
eﬀects. Let U(mjk,zjk,θ,tjk) indicate the ShoMig equilibrium’s utility level of an
individual native to jk, who is endowed with individual characteristics (mjk,zjk),
and faces policy parameters (θ,tjk). Then U(mjk,zjk,θ,tjk) and U(mjk,zjk,θ,0)
denote individual utility levels with, and without, the integration project being
implemented. Since utility is measured in terms of the numeraire good x (see (3)),
individual willingness-to-pay for the project in real terms, that can be positive or
negative, amounts to ∆U(mjk,zjk,θ,θ,tjk) = U(mjk,zjk,θ,tjk) − U(mjk,zjk,θ,0).















To highlight the project’s impact, we assume that, initially, border regions are not
integrated at all:
Assumption 1: θ = pR − pP.
From a stylised perspective, this must be a reasonable representation of the pre-
integration state. Initially, no one ﬁnds cross-border selling or shopping worthwhile,
i.e., e zjB = 0, and no Interior native moves towards the border, i.e., e mjB = 0.
Border rents settle at respective levels of Interior rents: rjB(θ) = dj = rjI, given
15Action Group Size Real Gain Redist. Gain
(PB,RB) CPB wC − wP − tPB − zPB −(1 − αP)∆rP
(PB,PI) MPB −mPB αP ∆rP
(PB,PB) NP − (CPB + MPB) −tPB −(1 − αP)∆rP
(PI,PB) MPI wC − wP − tPB − zPI − mPI −αP ∆rP
(PI,PI) NP − MPI 0 (1 − αP)∆rP
(RB,PB) CRB pR − pC − θ − tRB − zRB −(1 − αR)∆rR
(RB,RI) MRB −mRB αR ∆rR
(RB,RB) NR − (CRB + MRB) −tRB −(1 − αR)∆rR
(RI,RB) MRI pR − pC − θ − tRB − zRI − mRI −αR ∆rR
(RI,RI) NR − MRI 0 (1 − αR)∆rR
Table 1: Welfare Eﬀects of Integration by Group Aﬃliation
(12). Consequently, with native ownership, a Border native’s utility is equal to an
Interior native’s utility. For later reference, a Poor Border native’s utility is
U(mjk,zjk,θ,0) = wj − pj − (1 − αj)dj. (15)
With integration, individual utilities become those given in (6) and (10), evaluated
at the levels of the endogenous variables obtained in the ShoMig equilibrium for θ =
θ. We distinguish ten distinct groups of individuals that emerge under integration.
Table 1 lists these by the actions that characterize them. Moreover, for each group,
Table 1 gives the change in utility that any of its members enjoys, or incurs to endure,
under integration. This utility change, or individual willingness-to-pay ∆U, may be
decomposed into two components: ﬁrst, there are those purely ‘redistributive rent
gains and losses”, which are immediately oﬀset by someone else’s losses and gains,
given that landlords are part of the model. These changes, shown in column 4 of
Table 1, are neutral at the aggregate level. And, second, there are those ‘real gains
and losses”, which are not directly oﬀset. These comprise changes in wage income,
cross-border services price, and migration and cultural costs, as shown in Table 1’s
column 3. It is these latter changes that determine aggregate willingness-to-pay.
Proposition 4 now reviews how changes in policy or mobility characteristics aﬀect
aggregate willingness-to-pay for the integration project.
Proposition 4: Aggregate Willingness-To-Pay (AWTP)
(i) AWTP is decreasing in taxes tPB and tRB, is positive if these are suﬃciently
small, and is negative if taxes satisfy NPtPB + NRtRB = NR(θ − θ).
16(ii) AWTP is decreasing in the transaction costs θ obtained when the integration
project is implemented. Moreover, AWTP declines if the initial transaction costs θ
decrease.
(iii) AWTP is decreasing in migration cost parameters mP and mR.
We again delegate the proof to the appendix and instead focus on the intuition.
The proposition’s ﬁrst part addresses variations in taxes, reﬂecting variations in
project costs at given transaction cost parameters θ and θ. To understand this
part, ﬁrst note that, since there are no market distortions, for given individual
characteristics and policy individuals sort and shop eﬃciently. Since markets are
eﬃcient, any cut in transaction costs in itself implies aggregate gains and thus a
positive AWTP. Considering projects costs eP and eR, AWTP is positive as long as
the resultant taxes tPB and tRB are zero or suﬃciently close to zero. Obviously, larger
costs, and thus taxes, are associated with smaller aggregate project gain. Ultimately,
some projects are simply too costly to be viable. Should a project’s total tax burden,
i.e., NPtPB +NRtRB, even exceed the aggregate reduction of transaction costs to be
had if all Rich Border residents cross-border-shop, i.e., NR(θ −θ), then this project
would deﬁnitely reduce welfare.
The proposition’s second part analyses the eﬀects of variations in transaction costs
for given taxes, assuming that the levels θ and θ are independent of one another.
Naturally, the larger the project-induced cut in transaction costs θ − θ, the larger
is AWTP. A larger cut not only generates a greater beneﬁt per unit of cross-border
services traded but also causes the numbers of those trading in Poor’s services to
expand further. Thus AWTP is decreasing in transaction costs θ. Moreover, AWTP
is smaller if initial transaction costs θ are lower.
The proposition’s third part discusses the eﬀect of variations in mobility param-
eters mP and mR. Suppose that mP drops, meaning that mobility in Poor rises.
Higher mobility crowds Poor Border natives out of the cross-border services sector,
crowds in Poor Interior natives, and increases total cross-border sales, as shown
earlier in Proposition 3. Clearly, larger cross-border sales enhance trade gains. But
note that the change in cross-border sellers’ composition also promotes trade gains.
The cultural and migration costs of Poor Interior natives who now enter are actually
lower than the cultural costs of those Poor Border natives who are now driven out.5
Similarly, a decline in mR positively aﬀects total cross-border sales and the compo-
sition of cross-border shoppers, albeit probably on a smaller scale. Put diﬀerently,
more mobile societies are more eﬀective at sorting into the border’s proximity those
who require the lowest compensation for interacting with those from the border’s
other side. These therefore beneﬁt more strongly from a cut in transaction costs.
5And even those who leave Poor Border for Interior do that at lower perceived migration costs.
Note that, in our analysis, we have also taken account of the migration costs that burden those
Border natives in Rich and Poor who move to Interior.
175 Voting on the Regional Integration Project
Having analysed some important properties of the ShoMig Equilibrium for exoge-
nously given policy, we can now proceed to investigate the outcome of the referendum
on the regional integration project at the ﬁrst stage and the normative performance
of the voting process. We start by analysing the political preferences of the diﬀerent
types of citizens. Then proposition 5 speciﬁes the circumstances under which the
AWTP of any politically approved project is indeed positive. Proposition 6 discusses
the impact of intra-country mobility on voting. And propositions 7 and 8 ﬁnally
shed some light on the relationship between regional and (inter-)national policies.
5.1 Political Preferences
At the game’s ﬁrst stage, Border natives vote on the integration project (θ,tPB,tRB).
Natives to jB vote on (θ,tjB). Border region polls are separate but simultaneous.
Recall that citizens are fully rational. In particular, they take into account the im-
pact of the political outcome on the succeeding location and occupation choices when
they make their decisions at the polls.6 Any voter’s approval is solely governed by
whether the utility attained with the project implemented exceeds the utility with-
out it. So voters compare U(mjk,zjk,θ,tjk), obtained in ShoMig Equilibrium for θ
and tjk, with U(mjk,zjk,θ,0), obtained in ShoMig Equilibrium for θ. We divide vot-
ers into three groups, depending on which action in {(jB,jB), (jB,jI), (jB,iB)}
they take when the project is implemented. This division is independent of the
housing ownership regime that is in place (Proposition 1, Part (iv)).
Consider those who would choose (jB,jB), i.e., to stay in Border, but abstain from
cross-border selling or shopping. Far from reaping any of the integration project’s
prospective beneﬁts, these individuals would be exposed to all of its disadvantages.
Not only would they have to contribute to the project’s funding by having to pay
tax tjB. They would also even have to incur increased rent rjB > dj = rjI if
their dwelling belonged to an Interior landlord. That is, those who choose (jB,jB)
receive payoﬀ wj − pj − (1 − αj)dj without, and the unambiguously smaller payoﬀ
wj − pj − tjB − (1 − αj)rjB with, the project’s implementation (cf. (6) and (15)).
Anticipating this, they vote against the project, irrespective of the ownership regime
in place.
Next, consider those who would opt for (jB,jI), i.e. for leaving Border. These
individuals receive wj − pj − (1 − αj)dj without the project’s implementation, as
opposed to wj − pj − dj + αjrjB − mjB with it, as (6) and (10) show. The latter
exceeds the former whenever the individual’s migration costs mPB fall short of the
‘migration cost voting threshold’ e mV
jB = αj∆rj, or equivalently, by virtue of (8),
6This assumption seems to be empirically backed. According to Epple et al.’s (2001) analysis
of majority rule and Tiebout sorting, models based on sophisticated voting behaviour ﬁt the data
better than those based on myopic voting behaviour.
18whenever mPB falls short of
e m
V
jB = α(e mjB − tjB). (16)
With absentee ownership (i.e. α = 0), threshold e mV
jB simply is zero. Those who
would leave jB upon implementation of the project equivocally oppose it, since,
compared to the situation where the project is not implemented, here they have to
bear migration costs without receiving any beneﬁts. With native ownership (i.e.
α = 1), by contrast, threshold e mV
jB comes to match the rent diﬀerential ∆rj > 0,
since those who move to Interior can gain from renting out their property in Border.
Those whose migration costs are mjB < ∆rj support the project, whereas those
whose costs are mjB ≥ ∆rj turn out against it. Intuitively, native ownership makes
the project palatable to those who can easily cash in on the rent diﬀerential. This
is reminiscent of Wildasin (1986, 90).
Finally, consider those who would choose (jB,iB), i.e. to stay in Border and to
engage in cross-border selling or shopping. These receive wj−pj−(1−αj)dj without
integration, as opposed to ωj − (1 − αj)rjB − tjB − zjB with it. The latter payoﬀ
exceeds the former if, and only if, the individual’s cultural cost falls short of ‘cultural
cost voting threshold’ e zV




jB = e zjB − (1 − αj)∆rj − tjB =

e zjB − e mjB if αj = 0
e zjB − tjB if αj = 1 (17)
With native ownership, prospective cross-border traders vote in favour of the project
if, and only if, the cross-border sellers’ or shoppers’ gain from the project ωj −(wj −
pj), which equals e zjB, is not oﬀset entirely by the cultural cost and the ﬁscal burden.
Approval recedes even further with absentee ownership. Now only those who ﬁnd its
gain large enough to also cover the implied rise in border rent endorse integration.
Figure 3 illustrates voting thresholds e mV
jB and e zV
jB for both housing ownership
regimes. The heavily shaded area contains supporters’ characteristics with absentee
ownership. Additional, and more lightly, shaded areas add the characteristics of
those who join supporters’ ranks under native ownership. Approval is unambigu-
ously greater with native ownership, as is obvious from Figure 3. Supporters’ share















Figure 3 also shows that, for strictly positive taxes, not all cross-border shoppers
or sellers CjB vote for the project VjB. Individuals might beneﬁt from cross-border
interaction once the project is implemented, and taxes and higher rents have to be
paid anyway and are thus sunk. But they might, nevertheless, be better oﬀ in the
7We focus on ‘interior’ solutions; that is, solutions in which (i) 0 < e zV
PB < zP and – for the case
where α = 1 – (ii) 0 < e mV
PB < mP result.
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Figure 3: Housing Ownership Regime and Political Support
ﬁrst place without integration and its drawbacks. So individuals do not reveal that
they have supported the project ex ante just because they embrace the project’s
opportunities ex post (whatever the ownership regime).
5.2 Majorities, Welfare, and Mobility
Project approval requires a majority of votes in both border regions, i.e., VPB > 0.5
and VRB > 0.5. AWTP is certainly not positive for every project, as Proposition 4,
Part (i), shows. When can we be certain that the AWTP is positive for an approved
project? The following proposition shows that absentee ownership is a suﬃcient
condition.
Proposition 5: Voting and Aggregate Willingness to Pay
With absentee ownership (αj = 0), every approved project (θ,tPB,tRB) is strictly
welfare enhancing, meaning that, for every project approved, AWTP is positive.
We again provide the formal proof in the Appendix and now discuss this statement
rather informally. To understand our conclusion, recall that e zV
jB denotes the cultural
costs of the ‘marginal’ citizens who are just indiﬀerent between carrying out and not
carrying out the project. So the project gain of a cross-border seller or shopper with
cultural costs zjB < e zV
jB is exactly the diﬀerence e zV
jB − zjBi. Now imagine that all
individuals with zjB > e zV
jB would also become cross-border sellers or shoppers, with
20individual loss equal to zjB − e zV
jB. Even in this case, since (i) individual cultural
costs are symmetrically distributed around the critical value e zV
jB and (ii) zjB < e zV
jB
holds for more than 50% of the citizens if the project wins at the polls, for every
opponent of the project, there is a citizen whose individual beneﬁts are at least as
high as the opponent’s loss. And, in fact, opponents can further limit their losses,
either to ∆rj + tjB by avoiding cross-border shopping and selling (and staying in
the Borders) or to even less than this by moving to the Interior. Finally, note that
Interior natives cannot possibly lose from the integration project. After all, the
project does not just raise Interior landlords’ rent incomes received from Border
residents. It also provides them with the extra, and potentially interesting, option
of moving into the Border region. Consequently, AWTP is positive if the project is
approved by a majority.
This conclusion does not necessarily hold with native ownership. The reason is
that, in this case, the project is also supported by Border natives who will move to
Interior and cash in on the rent diﬀerential. Since this rent gain is purely redistribu-
tive, in a sense, voting outcome overstates real project gains.8
Note that Proposition 5 cannot be reversed. A project with a positive AWTP need
not be capable of securing approval. For example, suppose that there is absentee
ownership, and consider a project that divides the electorate on both sides of the
border evenly into supporters and opponents. Then that project’s AWTP must be
positive, given the previous paragraph’s discussion. Now, a small reduction in the
project’s eﬀectiveness, i.e. a small increase in θ, causes the project to be defeated at
the polls even though it would still improve welfare. In short, positive AWTP and
project approval need not coincide.
One might hope that greater intra-country mobility could contribute to overcoming
the political impasse. After all, since greater mobility induces more eﬀective sorting
and thus raises AWTP (see Proposition 4, Part (iii)), it might also promote the
project’s political acceptance. Proposition 6 cautions against this assertion.
Proposition 6: Voting and Mobility
(i) With absentee ownership (αj = 0), the share of supporters VjB is increasing in
the mobility parameter mj.
(ii) With native ownership (αj = 1), the share of supporters VjB is decreasing (in-
creasing) in the mobility parameter mj if the project’s ﬁscal burden tjB is suﬃciently
small (large).
(iii) Whichever the housing ownership regime, the share of supporters VPB (VRB)
is decreasing in the neighbouring country’s mobility parameter mR (mP).
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 6 argues that, with absentee ownership, greater mo-
8Proposition 5 also requires that the joint density function is not substantially skewed towards
types of low cultural costs. However, the assumption of a uniform distribution seems to be a
natural starting point, given that data on cultural and migration costs are hard to obtain.
21bility (i.e. a lower mj) actually generates less support for the project among border
natives. An integration project attracts Interior natives. In Poor, for instance, Inte-
rior immigrants add to existing cross-border sellers’ numbers, expanding the service’s
supply and driving down its price. This translates into smaller income gains that
voters can expect from the integration project in the ﬁrst place. In addition, the
inﬂow additionally pushes rents up. The greater mobility, the greater this inﬂow
of Interior natives, and the larger the negative impact of these immigrants on the
project gains of the Border natives. Thus, mobility lowers political support for the
project.
This also holds for Rich. Here, too, greater mobility means more Interior natives
moving to Border to cross-border shop, thus driving up both the cross-border services
price and Rich Border rent. Again, by reducing voters’ project beneﬁts, this inﬂow
comes at the expense of local support. Again political support for the project is
undermined. This political-economic impact of mobility has profound implications.
Consider a project with a positive AWTP that is approved of in a less mobile society.
This very project could fail at the polls in the more mobile society, even though its
AWTP would be even higher (Proposition 4, Part (iii)). In this sense, greater
mobility, while raising potential welfare gains, also makes realising these potential
gains less likely.
With native ownership this ambiguity disappears, though only for suﬃciently low
project costs. Cross-border traders are no longer alone in weighing up the project.
Those who would emigrate if the project were implemented now also consider sup-
porting it. Suppose, for the moment, that the project is free, i.e., suppose tjB = 0.
In this case e zV
jB = e zjB by (16), and e mV
jB = e mjB by (16). All individuals who are
involved in cross-border services trade, or who leave Border for Interior, beneﬁt from
the project, either by trade gains or by cashing in on rent diﬀerentials. The number
of supporters coincides with the number of those who ultimately engage in cross-
border trade upon project completion. (See Figure 3, and recall that Border natives
who emigrate are replaced by Interior natives who cross-border trade.) This number
is thus Y in Rich and Y/b in Poor. Since sales Y are decreasing in mj (Proposition
3, Part (i)), so too are supporters’ ranks. In fact, supporters’ ranks are decreasing in
mj even if taxes tjB are strictly positive, as long as taxes remain suﬃciently small.
Matters are diﬀerent, however, if taxes are large. A rising tax burden does not alter
the cross-border services’ sales and price (Proposition 2, Part (iii)), but it capitalizes
into lower Border rent and, hence, a diminished interregional rent diﬀerential (see
(8) and (12)). As tjB keeps rising, this diﬀerential vanishes, eventually resulting in
∆rj = 0 . With no rent diﬀerential left, a Border native who leaves for Interior
and rents her property can no longer beneﬁt from the integration project. Voting
thresholds e mV
jB and e zjB reduce to the values obtained with absentee ownership, i.e.,
to zero and e zjB − tjB, respectively (see (16) and (17)). Brieﬂy, if taxes are too
large, even native ownership cannot prevent approval from falling as mobility rises.
Conversely, if taxes are suﬃciently light, native ownership permits approval to rise
22with mobility, in a monotonic fashion (Proposition 6, Part (ii)).
Housing property rights matter for how changes in country j’s mobility aﬀect
project approval in j’s border region jB. By contrast, greater mobility in j raises
support for the integration project in iB regardless of i’s ownership regime. For
instance, greater mobility in Poor reinforces the supply of cross-border services,
causing the service price to drop. This unambiguously beneﬁts Rich shoppers, mak-
ing more of them inclined to welcome the project (Proposition 6, Part (iii)). Since
Rich Border becomes more attractive, Rich Border rent rises subsequently. With
native ownership, Rich Border natives, who move to Rich Interior and lease their
houses in Border, gain from a larger rent diﬀerential. Thus support is reinforced
even more under this ownership regime.
5.3 Complementarity of Regional and (Inter-)National Poli-
cies
Initial transaction costs θ as well as the leeway θ−θ are determined at the national
and international levels. These levels depend on the border control regulations and
other issues not under the control of the local authorities, as discussed above. In
this section we analyse how these exogenous policy parameters aﬀect the regional
political support for the integration project. More precisely, while we assume that
project costs (and thus the tax burden) do not change, transaction costs (with or
without the project’s implementation) vary due to exogenous policy changes at the
national or international levels. Our ﬁndings are summarised in
Proposition 7: Voting and (Inter-)National Policies
(i) Irrespective of the ownership regime, the project supporters’ shares VPB and VRB
are decreasing in transaction costs θ.
(ii) With absentee ownership, project supporters’ shares VPB and VRB increase if
the pre-project transaction costs θ fall.
The Proposition’s ﬁrst part is not surprising. It simply says that the more eﬀec-
tively the project lowers transaction costs, the broader its political support will be.
This is as we should expect it to be. For example, the central governments of Poor
and Rich could decide to ease border controls for public transport, thus reducing
transaction costs θ if the local authorities build a tram connection across the border.
Such a measure at the international level would obviously strengthen approval for
public transport across the border.
The Proposition’s second part is far less obvious. If, in the case of absentee
ownership, central governments cut those transaction costs that apply if the project
is not carried out, support for the integration project nonetheless increases. To
understand this conclusion, let us consider the group of individuals who become
cross-border sellers once the project is carried out, but nevertheless oppose cross-
23border integration politically. For these households, the income gain net of cultural
costs cannot compensate for the attendant increase in taxes and rents. However, the
lower the option θ, the higher the rents, even if the electorate rejects the project.
In other words, option θ becomes less attractive and, consequently, the integration
project becomes relatively more attractive. Therefore, more native cross-border
sellers support integration and the share of votes for the project increases. Note,
however, that this argument is only valid if cross-border sellers native to Poor Border
suﬀer from higher rents, which is only the case with absentee ownership. With native
ownership, by contrast, Poor Border natives are not concerned with rising rents,
and the share of votes for the project does not increase in response to declining
pre-project transaction costs θ. (A similar line of reasoning can be applied for Rich
Border.)
Proposition 7 further highlights the fact that the welfare and political-economic
implications of changes in the environment can be diametrically opposite. While
a decline in the initial transaction costs θ reduces the project’s aggregate beneﬁts
reﬂected in AWTP (Proposition 4, Part (ii)), in the case of absentee ownership this
decline also strengthens political support for the project. Projects that generate
lower beneﬁts might gain more votes than those that result in higher beneﬁts.
While a favourable environment in terms of low θ and θ strengthens local support
for the integration project, a grant sj from country j’s central government (or any
international institution) to partly cover project costs ej cannot necessarily do the
job. This conclusion holds even if Border natives do not contribute at all to funding
this grant, as we assume.
Proposition 8: Voting and Federal Grants
With absentee ownership, a grant sj from j’s central government that reduces local
taxes to ej −sj does not aﬀect the share of the project’s supporters VjB. With native
ownership, in contrast, the share of project supporters VjB is increasing in such a
central grant sj.
These results follow directly from the tax and subsidy incidence in the economy
(as formally proved in the appendix). A central grant curbs the local tax burden
caused by the project, but the induced cut in taxes is wholly capitalised in rents.
Thus, with absentee ownership, the grant does not relieve Border’s natives, but only
beneﬁts the landlords outside Border. Only if Border’s natives own their houses,
i.e., only in the case of native ownership, do they gain from this subsidy and overall
support for the project rises.
Of course, the clarity of a grant’s incidence hinges on the assumption that land
supply is ﬁxed. Otherwise Border natives would beneﬁt at least partly from a
central grant, and this central grant would enhance support for the integration
project even with absentee ownership. The crucial point is, however, that, even
in this extreme case with ﬁxed land supply, central governments can inﬂuence local
24voting, by manipulating the upper and lower bound of locally achievable transaction
costs, θ and θ. Obviously, the incidence of such indirect policies diﬀers from that of
grants, and it is worthwhile paying attention to these diﬀerences.
6 Discussion
Despite the potential welfare gains from cross-border shopping, transaction costs
remain high in many border regions, even when they could be lowered. We have
shown that this outcome can be intended, and backed, by a majority. We have
pointed to four major political obstacles to cross-border regional integration. First,
cultural costs of a majority of people might be too high. As high-cost types refrain
from cross-border interaction, they cannot beneﬁt from any integration project.
High-cost types are exposed only to the project’s drawbacks. Not only do they
oppose the integration project, they also might even constitute a majority even
when aggregate willingness-to-pay for the project is positive.
Second, intra-country mobility might also be too high. At ﬁrst this statement
might surprise. After all, at the heart of the problem is that the ‘wrong’ types of
individuals are native to border regions. So one might hope that greater mobility
provides a remedy for the political bias against cross-border integration. In mobile
societies, however, any improvement in the border region attracts individuals to
this region. This inﬂow of additional beneﬁciaries of cross-border trade comes at
the expense of the initial residents. In Poor, for example, this inﬂow depresses wages
in the cross-border services industry and drives up rents, thus diminishing political
support for the integration project (at least with absentee ownership).
So realising welfare gains can be a diﬃcult task politically for local jurisdictions
embedded in a federal structure with open boundaries. This point seems to be ne-
glected, given that the economic literature puts much stress on ineﬃciencies that
arise from inter-jurisdictional competition for production factors. Our line of rea-
soning implies that any policy aimed at promoting intra-country mobility can be
detrimental to cross-border integration. But this argument has to be treated with
some caution. With greater mobility, more individuals with high cultural ability
might be attracted to the border regions even if integration projects are initially re-
jected. Since such an inﬂow would change political majorities in the very long run,
it could ultimately pave the way for the political success of integration projects.
Third, the ownership regime can hamper political support for the integration
project. Integration raises rents in Border, but, with absentee ownership, the resul-
tant income does not stay with Border natives. By contrast, with native ownership,
local voters can additionally beneﬁt from rent increases, strengthening the support
for the project. Consequently, any policy that promotes people to invest in their
own homes, thus creating local ownership, strengthens support for ‘sensible’ local
public investments.
25Note that the assumption that land supply is ﬁxed in the Borders exaggerates
the relevance of the ownership structure, since it obviously overstates rent gains.
Allowing for land development in the border regions softens the eﬀects associated
with rents, but does not eliminate the fundamental importance of ownership. Also,
for our analysis, only the ownership of land in Border matters, since rent gains
accrue only there. The two regimes considered are thus suﬃcient to capture the
extreme cases that can arise. Furthermore, we expect that, if a region becomes
more attractive, rents rise in this region rather than fall in other regions. This
notion is reﬂected in our model by tying Interior rents to dj.
Fourth, central governments might give regional authorities too little leeway, lim-
iting the success of regional integration projects. Again, this undermines political
support for projects. It also shows that favourable (inter-)national policies leading
to low transaction cost levels θ and θ can trigger accompanying measures at the
regional level and thus generate ‘multiplier’ eﬀects. As we have already discussed
above, such a strategy might be more successful than providing grants to local gov-
ernments.
Finally, let us emphasise that, while analysing speciﬁc features of integration across
border regions in this paper, we also cover many problems of economic integration in
general. For instance, many measures that broaden support for integration projects
also make the drawbacks more pronounced. Lowering the transaction cost level
θ increases the number of Border natives who beneﬁt from the project. But the
additional trade gains also reinforce the rise in rents in Border. Thus greater support
and larger aggregate willingness-to-pay for a project go along with greater losses for
those on the losing side. We think this conﬂict occurs in many cases of economic
integration. This can explain why integration projects that promise high welfare
gains face particularly ﬁerce opposition. In this sense, cross-border integration is
globalisation in a nutshell.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have given a political-economic explanation for why regional integration across
borders might fail to appeal to the electorate even if it is welfare enhancing. On
the one hand, the analysis stresses the speciﬁc circumstances in border regions and
the relationships of these regions to central governments and their hinterlands. On
the other hand, it reveals the conﬂicts of economic integration in general. Our
conclusions might thus be relevant to a range of other issues related to economic
integration in a broad sense. Since we focus on the role of cultural ability and
intercultural contacts in services, our approach could also be applied to analysing
tourism. Projects to develop tourist spots yield relatively well-paid jobs for those
workers who like to interact with foreigners, but they also drive up rents. Individuals
with low cultural costs are expected to ﬂock into tourist areas and crowd out those
26with high costs, etc. The similarities between promoting cross-border shopping and
tourism are striking. We leave the details to a follow-up paper.
Also, we intend to further explore the relationships between border regions. For
instance, we have not said anything about how the project cost shares come about.
They must result from negotiations between the local authorities on both sides of
borders and will be shaped by the institutional arrangement in which the regions
operate. This gives plenty of opportunities to act strategically at the local and
federal levels. Moreover, we plan to investigate the role of the services suppliers on
the rich side who have good reasons to lobby against integration. We leave these
issues also to a future paper.
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29Appendix
Lemma 1: e zPB − e mPB is increasing in pC, and e zRB − e mRB is decreasing in pC + θ.
Proof of Lemma 1: We only show the Lemma’s ﬁrst part. The proof of its second
part is similar. Using (7), (8) and (12) we may rewrite e zPB − e mPB as:
e zPB − e mPB = e zPB (2¯ zP − e zPB)
1
2¯ zP
Pick two diﬀerent levels of e zPB, i.e., e z0
PB < e z00
PB. Then
0 < (e z
00
PB − e z
0
PB) (2¯ zP − e z
0







PB − e z
0
PB) < (e z
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PB − e z
0





PB (2¯ zP − e z
0
PB)/2¯ zP < e z
00
PB (2¯ zP − e z
00
PB)/2¯ zP
The third inequality follows from adding e z0
PB(2¯ zP−e z00
PB) to both sides of the second,
and dividing through by 2¯ zP. We conclude that e zPB− e mPB is increasing (i.e., strictly
increasing) in e zPB. Since e zPB is increasing in pC (see (4) and (7), e zPB − e mPB is
increasing in pC. 
Proof of Proposition 1: ShoMig Equilibrium
Part (i): By inspection of Figure 1,








Deﬁne excess demand as
E(pC,θ,mP,mR) ≡ YR(pC,θ,mR) − YP(pC,mP) (21)
Since e zjB is continuous in pC (see (4) and (7)), so is e mjB (see (12)). Hence YP
and YR are continuous in pC, too (see (19) and (20)). Since the sum of two con-
tinuous functions is continuous, excess demand E is continuous in pC. Finally,
YP(pP,mP) = 0, and therefore E(pP, θ, mP, mR) = YR(pP,θ,mR) > 0; whereas
YR(pR − θ,θ,mR) = 0, and so E(pR − θ, θ, mP, mR) = −YP(pR − θ,mP) < 0.
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists p∗
C ∈ (pP, pR − θ) for which
E(p∗
C, θ, mP, mR) = 0. Either YP(p∗
C, mP) or YR(p∗
C, θ,mR) give the equilibrium
quantity Y ∗.
Part (ii): Since e zPB and e mPB are increasing in pC (see (7) and (12)), point (e mPB, e zPB)
also is increasing in pC, in the natural order of R2. Clearly, YP is then increasing in
pC. Similarly, since e zRB and e mRB are decreasing (i.e., strictly decreasing) in (pC+θ)
(see (7) and (12)), point (e mRB, e zRB) is decreasing in pC. Clearly, YR is then de-
creasing in (pC + θ), and hence in pC and θ.
30Since −YP is decreasing in pC, excess demand E as the sum of two decreasing
functions is also decreasing in pC. Then it is straightforward to show that equi-





C . Then E(p∗
C) = E(p∗∗
C ). But then E is not decreasing in pC. This
is a contradiction.
Part (iii): Note ﬁrst the following three properties of the excess demand function. Since
E is decreasing in pC + θ (Proof of Part (ii)), E is decreasing in θ for given pC and
θ ∈ [0, pR−pP]. Next, since YR is decreasing in mR for given pC and for mR positive
and ﬁnite, so is E (see (20)). Finally, since −YP is increasing in mP for given pC
and for mP positive and ﬁnite, again so is E (see (19)).
Changes in θ,mR and mP shift excess demand. But excess demand remains con-
tinuous on [pP, pR − θ], and decreasing in pC. Moreover, changes in θ aﬀect excess
demand’s domain. But excess demand remains continuous on its domain, and de-
creasing in pC. Equilibrium continues to exist, and, in particular, to be unique. Thus
equilibrium values for pC, Y , rjB, MjB, MjI and CjB are functions of parameters
θ, mP and mR. 
Proof of Proposition 2: ShoMig Equilibrium and the Integration Project
Part (i): (a) Assume that the equilibrium price pC is not decreasing in θ. That is,
assume that there exist two diﬀerent transaction costs θ0 < θ00 with corresponding
equilibrium prices p0
C ≤ p00
C. Note ﬁrst that 0 = E(p00
C,θ00), by deﬁnition. Next,
E(p00
C,θ00) < E(p00
C,θ0), given that E is decreasing in θ (Proposition 1, Proof of Part
(iii)). And, E(p00
C,θ0) ≤ E(p0
C,θ0) given that E is decreasing in pC (Proposition 1,
Proof of Part (ii)). Joining (in)equalities yields 0 < E(p0
C,θ0). But then p0
C is not
the equilibrium price for θ0. This is a contradiction.
(b) Equilibrium supply YP is increasing in pC (Proposition 1, Proof of Part (ii)). Since
pC is decreasing in θ (see (a)), YP also is decreasing in θ. Since YP is decreasing in
θ, equilibrium demand YR and cross border sales Y are decreasing in θ.
(c) Equilibrium demand YR is decreasing in (pC +θ) (Proposition 1, Proof of Part (ii)).
Since the inverse of a decreasing function is decreasing, (pC +θ) is decreasing in YR.
Since YR is decreasing in θ (see (b)), (pC + θ) is increasing in θ.
(d) Wage wC is increasing in pC, by inspection of (4). Since pC is decreasing in θ (see
(a)), wC also is decreasing in θ.
(e) Poor Border rent rPB is increasing in pC, by inspection of (12) jointly with (5), (7)
and (8). Since pC is decreasing in θ (see (a)), rPB also is decreasing in θ.
(f) Rich Border rent rRB is decreasing in (pC + θ), by inspection of (12) joint with (5),
(7) and (8). Since (pC + θ) is increasing in θ (see (c)), rRB is decreasing in θ.
Part (ii) (a) Consider ﬁrst the intersection of the b zPB-line with the z-axis (see Figure
1 for illustration). Since e zPB − e mPB is increasing in pC (see Lemma 1), and since
31pC is decreasing in θ (Proof of Part (i), (a)), intersection e zPB − e mPB is decreasing
in θ. Consider next the intersection of the e zPB-line with the z-axis. Since e zPB is
increasing in pC (see (7)), and since pC is decreasing in θ (see Proof of Part (i), (a)),
e zPB is decreasing in θ. Since both intersections are decreasing in θ, and since CPB
is increasing in this pair of intersections (as is apparent from Figure 1), we conclude
that CPB is decreasing in θ.
(b) Note that MPI = 0.5(e zPB − e mPB)2. Since (e zPB − e mPB) is decreasing in θ (Proof of
(a)), MPI also is decreasing in θ.
(c) Since e zRB is decreasing in pC +θ (see (5) and (7)), and since pC +θ is increasing in θ
(Proof of Part (i), (c)), e zRB is decreasing in θ. Next, since e zRB − e mRB is decreasing
in pC + θ (see Lemma 1), and since pC + θ is increasing in θ (again, Proof of Part
(i), (c)), e zRB − e mRB is decreasing in θ. Along lines similar to (a) we conclude that
CRB is decreasing in θ.
(d) Note that MRI equals 0.5(e zRB − e mRB)2. Since e zRB − e mRB is decreasing in θ (Proof
of (c)), MRI also is decreasing in θ.
Part (iii) By virtue of (12), replace e mjB on the r.h.s. of (19) and (20) by [e zjB]2/2zj.
Both service supply and service demand thus are functions of e zPB and e zRB. Since
e zPB and e zRB themselves are functions of pC (see (7)), service supply and demand
depend on pC and exogenous parameters mj, zj, Nj, θ and b; but service supply and
service demand do not depend on taxes tjB. This reveals that pC must be constant
in taxes tPB and tRB. Hence so are cross-border sales Y , and so is cross-border
sellers’ wage wC.
Moreover, given that pC is constant in taxes, so are e zPB and e zRB (see (7)) as well
as, again by virtue of (12), e mPB and e mRB. Since e mPB and e mRB are invariant under
changes in taxes, any change in tax tjB must entirely capitalize into rent diﬀerential
∆rjB (see (8)) and Border rent rjB. In particular, rent rjB is decreasing in tjB. 
Proof of Proposition 3: ShoMig Equilibrium and Interregional Mobility
We focus on comparative statics with respect to mP. The proof of comparative statics
properties with respect to mR is similar.
Part (i): (a) Assume that the equilibrium price pC is not increasing in mP. That is,
assume that there exist two diﬀerent mobility parameters m0
P < m00
P with corre-
sponding equilibrium prices p0
C ≥ p00







P), given that E is increasing in mP (Proposition 1,




P), given that E is decreasing in




C is not the equilibrium price given m0
P. This is a contradiction.
(b) Wage wC is increasing in pC, by inspection of (4). Since pC is increasing in mP (see
(a)), wC is increasing in mP.
32(c) Equilibrium demand YR is decreasing in pC (Proposition 1, Proof of Part (ii)). Since
pC is increasing in mP (see (a)), YR is decreasing in mP. But then equilibrium
supply YP, and hence cross border equilibrium sales Y , are also decreasing in mP.
(d) Poor Border rent rPB is increasing in pC, by inspection of (12) joint with (5), (7)
and (8). Since pC is increasing in mP (see (a)), rPB is also increasing in mP.
(e) Rich Border rent rRB is decreasing in pC, by inspection of (12) jointly with (5), (7)
and (8). Since pC is increasing in mP (see (a)), rRB is decreasing in mP.
Part (ii): (a) Consider the intersection of the e zPB-line with the z-axis ﬁrst, i.e., e zPB.
Since e zPB is increasing in pC (see (7)), and since pC is increasing in mP (Part (i),
(a)), e zPB is increasing in mP. Consider next the intersection of the b zPB-line with
the z-axis, i.e., e zPB − e mPB. Suppose m0
P < m00
P. We distinguish between two cases.
In the ﬁrst case e z00
PB − e m00
PB ≥ e z0
PB. Then C00
PB > C0
PB is obvious. In the second
case, where e z00
PB − e m00
PB < e z0
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The second inequality follows from the ﬁrst by the fact that e z0
PB − (e z00
PB − e m00
PB) <
e m0
PB, as apparent from Figure 4. The third inequality follows from the second
by comparison of the corresponding areas in Figure 4. We conclude that CPB is
increasing in mP.
(b) Since cross border sales YP and hence the total number of cross-border sellers YP/b
are decreasing in mP (Part (i),(c)), and since CPB is increasing in mP (see (a)),
MPI = YP/b − CPB as the sum of two decreasing functions, YP/b and −CPB, must
be decreasing in mP.
Part (iii): (a) Recall that e zRB and e zRB − e mRB are both decreasing in pC (see (7) and
Lemma 1). Hence CRB is decreasing in pC. Since pC is increasing in mP (Part (i),
(a)), CRB is decreasing in mP.
(b) Note that MRI = 0.5(e zRB − e mRB)2. Since MRI is increasing in e zRB − e mRB, since
e zRB − e mRB is decreasing in pC (see Lemma 1), and since pC is increasing in mP
(Part (i), (a)), MRI is decreasing in mP. 
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Figure 4: An Increase in Mobility Cost in Poor
Proof of Proposition 4: Integration and Welfare
Part (i): Since individuals’ redistributive gains owed to changes in Border rents (given
by Table 1’s last column) cancel out, computation of AWTP reduces to integration
over individuals’ real gains (given by Table 1’s third column).
Now, taxes tPB and tRB are constant across individuals. This permits us to write
AWTP as the sum of aggregate tax payments −NPtPB +NR tRB and a second term
capturing those aggregate real gains that arose if project costs were zero:
AWTP(θ, θ, tPB, tRB) = − (NP tPB + NR tRB) + AWTP(θ, θ, 0, 0) (22)
(a) Since taxes tPB and tRB do not alter the sets into which indiﬀerence loci partition
the support of Fj (Proof of Proposition 2, Part (iii)), the second term on the r.h.s.
of (22) is constant in tPB and tRB. Taxes only have that direct eﬀect captured by
the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (22). Since that term is obviously decreasing in tPB
and tRB, then so is AWTP(θ, θ, tPB, tRB).
(b) Next we show that AWTP(θ, θ, 0, 0) > 0. – Rather than explicitly computing
AWTP(θ, θ, 0, 0), we extract its sign as follows. Any Poor Border native turned
cross-border seller reveals zPB < e zPB. For this household, wC − wP − zPB > 0,
given (7). Any Poor Border native turned emigrant reveals mPB < e mPB. Hence
∆rP > mPB, given (8). That is, any emigrant’s real loss is bounded from above, by
34∆rP. Finally, any Poor Interior native migrating into Poor Border reveals zPI < e zPI.
Hence wC −wP −zPI −mPI > ∆rP, given (11). That is, any immigrant’s real gain
is bounded from below, by ∆rP.
Given MPB = MPI in ShoMig Equilibrium, we can pair oﬀ emigrants with immi-
grants. Combining previous inequalities, for each such pair wC −wP −zPI −mPI >
∆rP > mPB. An immigrant’s real gain dominates the matching emigrant’s real loss.
Joining this with the fact that every Poor Border native turning cross-border seller
clearly experiences positive real gain permits us to derive that aggregate willingness
to pay in Poor is positive. Similar reasoning applies to Rich. We conclude that
AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0) > 0 (23)
(c) Here we show that AWTP (θ, θ, tPB, tRB) < 0 if tPB and tRB satisfy NR(θ− θ) =
NP tPB+NR tRB. – Surely, if each Rich Border resident became cross-border shopper
and if no cross-border shopper or cross-border seller incurred any cultural or mobility
cost AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0) could attain its maximum of NR(θ−θ). Yet sellers do exhibit
cultural and mobility costs. Hence AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0) generally must fall short of
NR(θ − θ). But then
AWTP (θ, θ, tPB, tRB) = AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0) − NP tPB − NR tRB (24)
< NR(θ − θ) − NP tPB − NR tRB = 0
The ﬁrst equality is repeated from the ﬁrst line of (22). The last equality holds by
assumption.
(d) Finally we show that AWTP (θ, θ, tPB, tRB) > 0 for some (and hence even
if) tPB,tRB > 0. – First, note that AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0) > 0 (see (b)). And second,
note that AWTP (θ, θ, t00
PB, t00
RB) < 0 for suﬃciently large tax rates t00
PB, t00
RB (see
(c)). Third, note that AWTP (θ, θ, tPB, tRB) is continuous in tPB and tRB. Pick
c ∈ (0, AWTP (θ, θ, 0, 0)). By the intermediate value theorem there must exist
t0
PB,t0
RB > 0 such that AWTP (θ, θ, t0
PB, t0
RB) = c > 0.
Part (ii): (a) Consider transaction costs θ
0 ∈ (0,θ) and the corresponding individual
utility level U(mjk,zjk,θ
0,tjk). By deﬁnition, the individual willingness-to-pay for a
reduction in transaction costs from θ to θ













35where the last line follows from (24). Since AWTP(θ,θ
0,0,0) > 0, i.e., AWTP for
cutting transaction costs from θ to θ
0 is strictly positive (see (23) with θ = θ and
θ = θ
0), AWTP(θ,θ
0,tPB,tRB) > AWTP(θ,θ,tPB,tRB) results, which proves the
ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 (ii).
(b) Finally, we prove that a decline in the initial transaction costs from θ to θ
0






and the corresponding indi-
vidual utility level U(mjk,zjk,θ
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,0,0) > 0, i.e., AWTP for cutting transaction costs from θ to θ
0
is strictly positive (see again (23)), AWTP(θ,θ,tPB,tRB) > AWTP(θ
0
,θ,tPB,tRB)
holds, which proves our statement.
Part (iii): Let us show that AWTP is decreasing in mj. Our proof consists of two main
arguments: First, the number of sales Y declines, thereby reducing gross beneﬁts
from cross-border interaction. Second, cross-border sellers/shoppers and migrants
with higher cultural and migration costs replace individuals with lower costs, thereby
diminishing net beneﬁts from the remaining sales. Both eﬀects reduce AWTP. We
consider a decline in mP, but the same line of reasoning can be applied with respect
to a decline in mR.
(a) We start with identifying the decisive variables for AWTP: A rise in mP leads to
a higher price pC (Proposition 3, Part (i)). This price increase in itself, i.e., for
given sales Y , does not aﬀect AWTP, since the additional gains of cross-border
sellers are exactly matched by the decline in gains of cross-border shoppers. In this
sense, changes in the price pC are neutral; it is sales Y and the induced cultural and
migration costs, zjk and mjk, that are crucial.
(b) Next, we sum up the impact of mP on the thresholds e zPB and e mPB and thus on
the zPk-mPk types who cross-border sell or migrate (see (7)-(9) and (11)): A rise in
mP from m0
P to m00
P increases e mPB from e m0
PB to e m00
PB (Proposition 3, Part (i) and
(8)), e zPB from e z0
PB to e z00
PB (Proposition 3, Part (i) and (7)), and e zPB − e mPB from
e z0
PB − e m0
PB to e z00
PB − e m00
PB (Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, Part (i)). The changes in
Poor Border are illustrated in Figure 4.
(c) In addition, recall that Y is decreasing in mP (Proposition 3, Part (i)), CPB is
increasing in mP (Proposition 3, Part (ii)), and MPI = Y/b−CPB must be decreasing
in mP (Proposition 3, Part (ii)).
(d) Next, we argue that, within the group of cross-border sellers, the ‘number’ of each
high-cost type (i.e., zPB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB or zPI + mPI > e z0
PB − e m0
PB) increases
36in mP, whereas the ‘number’ of each low-cost type (i.e., zPB ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB or
zPI +mPI ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB) decreases or remains constant. Since sales Y decline, ‘old’
zPk-mPk types who cross-border sell are replaced by ‘new’ zPk-mPk types whose cul-
tural and migration costs exceed those of the ‘old’ types. To this end, we subdivide
Poor’s cross-border sellers into six groups (see Figure 4 for illustration):
Group 1: Border natives with zPB ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB. The types of this group re-
main cross-border sellers. Moreover, a rise in mP does not aﬀect their number (i.e.,
N(e z0
PB − e m0
PB)m0
P/(zPm0
P) = N(e z0
PB − e m0
PB)m00
P/(zPm00
P)), nor does it aﬀect the
distribution of zPB within this group. The number of each zPB-type remains un-
changed.
Group 2: Border natives with zPB ∈ (e z0
PB− e m0
PB,e z0
PB] and zPB−mPB ≤ e z0
PB− e m0
PB.
The types of group 2 also remain cross-border sellers. Simple calculation shows that
a rise in mP from m0
P to m00
P increases the group’s size, i.e., ‘new’ size > ‘old’ size
⇔
[e z0
PB − (e z0
PB − e m0
PB)]m00








PB − (e z0
PB − e m0
PB)]m0






and similarly the ‘number’ of each zPB-type within this group. Consequently,
the types of this group provide additional cross-border sellers with cultural costs
zPB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB. Since the size of group 1 remains unchanged and the amount
of sales declines in response to a higher mP, these additional cross-border sellers re-
place Poor Interior natives whose cultural and mobility costs would have amounted
to zPI +mPI ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB (see (11)). Comparing costs reveals that the costs of the
‘new’ sellers exceed those of the ‘old’ ones, i.e., zPB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB ≥ zPI + mPI.
Group 3: Border natives with zPB ∈ (e z0
PB,e z00
PB], zPB − mPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB, and
mPB > e m0
PB. These types now switch from (PB,PB) to (PB,RB) and again
replace Poor Interior natives as cross-border sellers. The resulting cultural costs
again exceed those of the Poor Interior natives who are replaced, i.e., zPB > e z0
PB >
e z0
PB − e m0
PB ≥ zPI + mPI (see (11)).
Group 4: Border natives with zPB − mPB ∈ (e z0
PB − e m0
PB,e z00
PB − e m00
PB] and mPB ≤
e m0
PB. These types now switch from (PB,PI) to (PB,RB), leading to additional
cultural costs zPB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB + mPB, but also releasing mPB by no longer em-
igrating to Poor Interior. Note that these types’ net additional costs zPB − mPB
exceed the cultural and migration costs of those Poor Interior households replaced
as cross-border sellers because zPB−mPB > e z0
PB−e m0
PB ≥ zPI+mPI (see again (11)).
Group 5: Interior natives with zPI + mPI ∈ (e z0
PB − e m0
PB,e z00
PB − e m00
PB]. These
types now switch from (PI,PI) to (PI,PB), leading to cultural and migration
37costs zPI +mPI > e z0
PB − e m0
PB. Again, since MPI goes down in response to a higher
mP, they replace ‘old’ type cross-border sellers native to Interior whose cultural and
migration costs zPI + mPI ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB were below those of the ‘new’ types.
Group 6: Interior natives with zPI + mPI ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB. The types of this group
remain cross-border sellers. A rise in mP reduces the number of each zPI-mPI type
within this group.
To sum up, ‘old’ zPk-mPk types who cross-border sell are replaced by ‘new’ zPk-
mPk types whose cultural and migration costs exceed those of the ‘old’ types.
(e) In addition, ‘old’ mPB types who migrate from Border to Interior are replaced by
‘new’ mPk types whose migration costs exceed those of the ‘old’ types. Border natives
with zPB −mPB > e z00
PB − e m00
PB and mPB ∈ (e m0
PB, e m00
PB] now switch from (PB,PB)
to (PB,PI), causing migration costs mPB > e m0
PB. Since MPI and thus the number
of migrants fall in response to a higher mP (Proposition 3 (ii)), they replace ‘old’
type migrants native to Poor Border whose migration costs mPB ≤ e m0
PB would be
below the ones of the ‘new’ migrants.
(f) To sum up, AWTP decreases in mP because of two reasons: ﬁrst, a rise in mP
decreases the amount of sales Y . This reduces AWTP since each sale positively
contributes to real gains of cross-border shopping and thus to AWTP (which follows
from Proposition 4, Proof of Part (i), (b)). The negative impact of a decline in sales
on AWTP will exist even if the cultural and migration costs of the remaining cross-
border sellers/shoppers and migrants remain unchanged. This aﬀects both countries,
Rich and Poor, negatively. Second, cross-border sellers and migrants with higher
cultural and migration costs replace individuals with lower costs in Poor. This
further diminishes AWTP. (Such a replacement eﬀect only concerns Poor and does
not occur in Rich.) We conclude that AWTP decreases in mP. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Voting and Aggregate Willingness to Pay
On the one hand, natives with zjB ≤ e zV
jB beneﬁt from, and approve of, integration.
Following Table 1’s entry for (PB,RB)) and employing (17), a given beneﬁciary’s
utility gain is (e zV
jB−zjB). The beneﬁciaries’ average gain is (e zV
jB)/2. Since the beneﬁ-
ciaries’ total number is (e zV
jB)(Nj /¯ zj), their aggregate gain is simply (e zV
jB)2(Nj /2¯ zj).
On the other hand, natives with zjB > e zV
jB suﬀer from, and hence vote against, the
project. Because losers not necessarily cross-border-trade (since they often do better
by withdrawing from cross-border trade altogether) individual loss at most equals
(and, in fact, often strictly falls short of) (zjB − e zV
jB). The losers’ average loss must
be strictly smaller than (¯ zj − e zV
jB)/2. Because the losers’ total is (¯ zj − e zV
jB)(Nj/¯ zj),
Border’s aggregate loss must strictly fall short of (¯ zj − e zV
jB)2(Nj/2¯ zj).
With absentee ownership and a uniform distribution of households, approval re-
quires e zV
jB > ¯ zj − e zV
jB. The comparision of aggregate gains with aggregate losses
reveals the former to dominate the latter, within either border region.
38Finally, Interior natives always are better oﬀ, given their ownership of Border land
combined with the fact that Border rents rise along with integration. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Voting and Mobility
Part (i): In the scenario of absentee ownership, e zV
PB = e zPB − e mPB (see (17)). Since
e zPB − e mPB is increasing in pC (Lemma 1), and since pC is increasing in mP (Propo-
sition 3, Part (i), (a)), e zV
PB is increasing in mP.
Since VPB is increasing in e zV
PB (see (18)), and since e zV
PB is increasing in mP, VPB is
increasing in mP. Similar reasoning applies to the response of VRB to a change in
mR.
Part (ii): (a) Consider the extreme case with tPB = tRB = 0 ﬁrst. Note that then e zV
PB =
e zPB (see (17)) and e mV
PB = e mPB (see (16)). But then VPB = CPB + MPB = Y/b.
Since Y/b is decreasing in mP (Proposition 3, Part (i), (c)), VPB is decreasing in mP.
(b) We now turn to the general case where taxes are non-negative. Suppose m0
P <
m00
P. Deﬁne the increment in Poor Border votes due to the increase in Poor’s mobil-





deﬁne the critical values following from m0
P and tPB (m00





PB, etc.). Note ﬁrst that ∆VPB(m0
P,m00
P,0) < 0 (see (a)). Moreover, for
mP = m0
P, tax tPB = (e z0
PB)2/(2zP) implies ∆rP = 0 (see (12)). Then, e m0
PB = tPB
(see (8) and thus (e mV
PB)0 = e m0
PB − tPB = 0 (see (16) with α = 1), leading to
VPB(m0
P,(e z0
PB)2/2zP) = (e zV
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increase in e zPB, (see (17) with α = 1), which in turn increases in mP. The second
term is obviously non-negative.
Finally, note that ∆VPB(m0
P,m00
P,tPB) is a continuous function of tax tPB on the
interval [0,(e zPB)2/(2zP)]. By the intermediate value theorem, there must exist two
critical tax values tcv1
PB ∈ (0,(e zPB)2/(2zP)) and tcv2
PB ∈ (0,(e zPB)2/(2zP)), tcv1
PB < tcv2
PB,
such that (i) ∆VPB(m0
P,m00
P,tPB) < 0 if tPB ∈ [0,tcv1
PB) and (ii) ∆VPB(m0
P,m00
P,tPB) >
0 if tPB ∈ (tcv2
PB,(e zPB)2/(2zP)]. Since tPB = (e zPB)2/2zP is the largest tax level com-
patible with an ‘interior’ solution, i.e., with e mV
PB ≥ 0, it constitutes the upper tax
boundary of our analysis. The results will, however, still hold if we consider bound-
ary solutions. – A similar line of reasoning applies to the response of VRB to a change
in mR.
39Part (iii): Note ﬁrst that pC is decreasing in mR (Proposition 3, Part (i)). Since ∆rP
is increasing in pC given (12), since e mPB is increasing in ∆rP given (8) and since
e mV
PB is increasing in e mPB given (16), e mV
PB is decreasing in mR.
Moreover, since e zV
PB is increasing in pC (see (17), (7) and Lemma 1), and since
pC is decreasing in mR (Proposition 3, Part (i)), e zV
PB is decreasing in mR.
We conclude that VPB is decreasing in mR, too. A similar argument applies to
the response of VRB to a change in mP. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Voting and Inter(National) Policies
Part (i): In the scenario of absentee ownership, e zV
PB = e zPB − e mPB (see (17)). Since
e zPB − e mPB is increasing in pC (Lemma 1), and since pC is decreasing in θ (Propo-
sition 2, Part (i)), then e zV
PB is decreasing in θ. Thus, VPB is decreasing in θ in the
case where αP = 0.
In the case of native ownership, e zV
PB = e zPB − tPB (see (17)). Since e zPB is in-
creasing in pC, and since pC is decreasing in θ (Proposition 2, Part (i)), e zV
PB is
decreasing in θ. – Moreover, ∆rP is decreasing in θ (Proposition 2, Part (i)). But
then e mV
PB = ∆rP also is decreasing in θ (see (8)). Thus, VPB is decreasing in θ in
the case where αP = 1, too.
Similar reasoning applies to the response of VRB to a change in mR. 
Part (ii): Relaxing Assumption 1, we assume now that, without project implementa-
tion, transaction costs are θ
0
< pR − pP. Let variables’ equilibrium values obtained
for θ = θ
0
be indexed by one prime, and variables’ equilibrium values obtained for
θ = θ by two primes. E.g., w0
C is the equilibrium wage of cross-border sellers for ini-
tial transaction cost θ
0
, while w00
C is the respective wage for post-project transaction
cost θ. (Consequently, e z0
PB = w0
C − wP, e z00
PB = w00
C − wP etc.) We ﬁrst analyse who
supports a project that reduces transaction costs from θ
0
to θ. Then we compare
the supporters’ share in this case with the share that would result if transaction
costs fell from θ = pR − pP to θ. Again the focus is on Poor, but the same line of
reasoning can be applied to analyse the situation in Rich.
(a) With absentee ownership (α = 0), only individuals who cross-border sell for
θ = θ might support the project that cuts transaction costs from θ
0
to θ. These
individuals, who choose (PB,RB) for θ = θ, can be subdivided into three groups,
depending on their optimal choice for θ = θ
0
< pR −pP. We analyse the support for
the project within each of these three groups in turn.
Group 1: Households who choose (PB,RB) for θ = θ
0
and (PB,RB) for θ = θ
(types with zPB ≤ e z0
PB and zPB ≤ e z0
PB − e m0
PB + mPB = b z0
PB). The integration














C − wP − (w
0
C − wP) − [r
00




PB − dP)] (25)
= e z
00
PB − e m
00
PB − (e z
0
PB − e m
0
PB),
where we used (7) and (8). The following reasoning uses the fact that e mPB =
∆rP + tPB = e z2
PB/2zP only depends on pC, which in turn is independent of tPB
(Proposition 2, Part (iii)). Thus, neither e mPB nor e zPB − e mPB is aﬀected by tPB.
Since e zPB − e mPB is increasing in pC (Lemma 1) and pC is decreasing in θ (Propo-
sition 2, Part (i)), e zPB − e mPB is decreasing in θ. Thus, e z00
PB − e m00
PB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB
and ∆U|Group1 > 0. Consequently, all households that already cross-border sell at
θ = θ
0
and continue to cross border sell at θ = θ support the project.
Group 2: Households that choose (PB,PI) for θ = θ
0
and (PB,RB) for θ = θ
(types with mPB ≤ e m0
PB, zPB > e z0
PB − e m0
PB +mPB and zPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB +mPB).
Each of this group’s household beneﬁt from the project is
∆U|Group2 = w
00
C − wP − zPB − (r
00
PB + tPB − dP − mPB)
= e z
00
PB − e m
00
PB − (zPB − mPB) ≥ 0, (26)
where ∆U|Group2 ≥ 0 directly follows from the group’s characteristic zPB ≤ e z00
PB −
e m00
PB+mPB. Thus all households that migrate to Interior for θ = θ
0
and cross-border
sell for θ = θ support the project.
Group 3: Households that choose (PB,PB) for θ = θ
0
and (PB,RB) for θ = θ
(types with zPB > e z0
PB, mPB > e m0
PB, zPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB + mPB and zPB ≤ e z00
PB).
Following the arguments above, a household in this group experiences a beneﬁt of
∆U|Group3 = w
00
C − wP − zPB − (r
00





PB − e m
00
PB − (zPB − e m
0
PB)
This expression is positive, i.e., ∆U|Group3 ≥ 0, if zPB ≤ e z00
PB− e m00
PB+ e m0
PB =: (e zV
PB)00
holds. Since (e zV
PB)00 ∈ (e z0
PB,e z00
PB), some but not all of the households of group 3 sup-
port the project.
(b) To sum up, in the case of θ
0
< pR−pP, the project is supported by all households
with zPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB +mPB and zPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB + e m0
PB. The set of supporters
contains all households of groups 1 and 2 and some households of group 3. By con-
trast, in the case of θ = pR − pP, support merely comes from those households that
satisfy zPB ≤ e z00
PB − e m00
PB = e zV
PB (Equation (17)). Thus, support is unequivocally
smaller in the case of θ = pR − pP than in the case of θ
0
< pR − pP. 
41Proof of Proposition 8: Voting and Federal Grants
We turn to the case of absentee ownership (α = 0) ﬁrst. Note that e zjB − e mjB
does not vary with tjB (Proposition 2, Proof of Part (iii)). But then neither does
e zV
jB/zj. That is, then neither does VjB (see (18)). Supporters’ numbers are constant
with respect to tjB, and hence with respect to grant sj.
We turn to the case of native ownership (α = 1) next. Note that e zjB is constant
in tjB (Proposition 2, Proof of Part (iii)), while −tjB obviously is decreasing in tjB.
But then e zV
jB = e zjB − tjB is a decreasing function of tjB. Moreover, for α = 1,
e mV
jB = e mjB −tjB = ∆rjB is decreasing in tjB because ∆rjB is decreasing in tjB (see
(16) and Proposition 2, Part (iii)). Supporters’ numbers are decreasing in tjB, and
hence increasing in grant sj. 
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